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 Abstract 
Previous empirical analyses have concluded that political events can have 
significant linkages with stock returns. Using Brown & Warner’s (1984) OLS market 
model, I examine the effect of political disruptions in the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings on 
major stock indices of Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Dubai and 
London. My analysis finds mostly negative abnormal returns, highly statistically 
significant relative to the S&P 500, associated with many key events between December 
1st, 2010 and December 1st, 2011. My findings suggest that the loss of investor wealth can 
be attributed to dramatic regime changes and large scale protests during that time period.   
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On December 17, 2010, Muhammad Bouazizi became the most famous vegetable 
vendor in the world, when he set himself ablaze in front of the local government building 
in the Sidi Bouzid, a rural town in Tunisia. Earlier in the day, a policewoman had 
confiscated his wares and publicly humiliated him. He tried to complain to the 
municipality but to no avail. Bouazizi’s self-immolation stood as a symbol not just 
against corruption, but also a sheer lack of economic opportunities that the youth of his 
generation was facing. The Arab uprisings represented a landmark disruption in the 
political landscape of the Arab world as well as the world at large. What began as 
peaceful protests in late 2010 has led to the overthrow in the entire governments of 
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. While the sweeping rebellion manifested itself in different 
countries in varying degrees, protestors shared a common demand for democratic 
institutions, fundamental human rights and the creation of economic opportunities. 
James Gelvin, in his analysis of the Arab uprisings asserts the significance of the 
“human element” in determining whether an uprising will or will not occur. He observes 
that oftentimes in the history of the world, even if certain conditions are met that make it 
ripe for an uprising, its occurrence is hardly inevitable. He argues that people’s sense of 
deprivation changes as circumstances unfold, and they may suddenly discover a cause 
worth fighting for once their neighbors have taken to the streets. There is a role played by 
unexpected events that people might latch on (or not) to reinterpret their circumstances in 
new ways and that all rebellions, including the Arab uprisings, are by their nature 
unpredictable, as are the courses they take. 
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Consistent with Gelvin’s argument, a voluminous body of past literature has 
shown that the effect of unexpected political events can oftentimes statistically 
significantly explain abnormal returns in stock markets. Many studies suggest a close 
association between political risks and stock markets. The inherent unpredictability of the 
Arab uprisings is reason to believe that the jump in stock market returns and jump in 
stock market volatility can perhaps be attributed to its dramatic political disruptions. 
Large scale protests and overthrow of entire regimes, characteristic of the Arab uprisings 
certainly affect fiscal and monetary policies thereby indirectly affecting stock markets. 
But moreover, such events send a strong signal to investors of a high degree of 
uncertainty in the stability of the political and economic apparatus, thereby directly 
manifesting their effect in abnormal stock market returns.  
My paper seeks to examine and quantify abnormal stock returns during the 
uprisings in the region. As far as I know, there has been no prior literature that attempts to 
explore the Arab uprising in terms of its wealth implications. My research finds that 
many key events of the uprisings are associated with highly statistically significant 
negative abnormal returns particularly. The most notable events include the ousters of 
Tunisian President Ben Ali, Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi and 
Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq and the large scale occupation of Tahrir Square 
on November 21, 2011. Surprisingly, my study finds no statistically significant returns 
associated with the capture and assassination of Libyan dictator, Col. Gadhafi. It is also 
noteworthy that Egyptian and Tunisian stock markets suspend trading for most of the 
months of February and March 2011, at the height of their political and economic 
instability. 
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The organization of this paper is as follows. Section I provides an overview of the 
uprisings, with a detailed description of key events. Section II provides a survey of the 
existing literature with respect to the effect of news, both economic and political on stock 
returns. Section III describes the dataset and the methodology used in my empirical 
analysis. Section IV describes key results. Section V concludes, providing implications 
for further research. 
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I. Overview 
Table I 
A Chronology of Key Events
1
 
Date Event 
12/17/2010 
Tunisia — A young man sets himself on fire in the Sidi Bouzid region 
after police confiscate the fruits and vegetables he sold without a 
permit. Mohamed Bouazizi had a university degree but no steady work, 
and his hardship resonates with many in Tunisia. 
1/14/2011 Tunisia — President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali flees to Saudi Arabia. 
  
Jordan — More than 5,000 Jordanians take to the streets across the 
country to protest rising prices for fuel and foodstuffs and demand the 
prime minister's ouster. 
2/11/2011 
Egypt — Egyptian Vice President Suleiman says President Mubarak is 
stepping down and delegating Egypt's affairs to the army. 
2/27/2011 
Tunisia — Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi says he is stepping 
down. Protesters and policemen clash in central Tunis. Interim 
President Foued Mebazaa says he asked Béji Caïd-Essebsi, a former 
government minister, to replace Mr. Ghannouchi. 
3/3/2011 
Egypt — Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq resigns and is replaced by a 
U.S.-educated former transport minister, Essam Sharaf. Protest leaders 
and opposition politicians welcome the choice. 
10/20/2011 
Libya — Col. Gadhafi is captured alive during a final push to seize his 
hometown, Sirte, but is killed by revolutionary forces. 
11/21/2011 
Egypt — The army-appointed government hands in its resignation as 
tens of thousands of protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square clash with 
security forces for a third straight day in violence that has killed at least 
24 people. 
 
A. An Overview of Key Events 
This section provides a brief history of the Arab uprisings by elaborating on the 
key events listed in Table I. Most of the information is based on James Gelvin’s account 
in his book The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know. 
                                                 
1 Timeline: The Major Events of The Arab Spring,” NPR, accessed November 27, 2012, 
http://www.npr.org/2012/01/02/144489844/timeline-the-major-events-of-the-arab-spring. 
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The self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi in rural Sidi Bouzid touched off 
protests that reached Tunisia’s capital by December 27. Tunisia’s President Zine-al 
Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled for a quarter of a century, tried to pacify protestors by 
making promises of new jobs and new parliamentary elections, but to no avail. With the 
army refusing to fire on the protestors, Ben Ali fled the country on January 14, leaving 
the country in the hands of a caretaker government. 
The Tunisian uprising was the first in a series of cascading events that swept 
through the Arab world. About a week and a half after the departure of Ben Ali, young 
people, many of whom belonged to an organization called the “April 6 Movement,” 
began their occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo; strikes and antigovernment protests 
spread throughout Egypt. On February 11, the army took matters in its own hands: it 
deposed the incumbent ruler of thirty years, and established a new government under the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. 
After Ben Ali fled Tunisia, Mohamed Ghannouchi, his prime minister and 
political crony, announced he was taking the job of transitional president in direct 
violation of the Tunisian constitution. Despite the fact that he shortly returned to his 
original position, the real power still lay with him. The “second Tunisian revolution” 
lasted through March 2011, and by the six-month anniversary of the flight of Ben Ali, 
Ghannouchi was gone for good and the government had given in to a number of the 
protestors’ demands. 
In the aftermath of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings, a coalition of groups, 
including an umbrella group called the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition, 
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issued a call on social media for Libyans to participate in their own “Day of Rage” to 
protest political and economic conditions in Libya. From the beginning, the regime met 
the uprising with an appalling level of violence. After six months of intense fighting and 
the engagement of NATO jets providing close combat air support to the rebels, Tripoli 
fell to the rebels in August 2011. Two months later, rebels found and killed Gaddafi in 
home town of Surt. 
 In November 2011, the largest demonstrations in Egypt since the resignation of 
Hosni Mubarak took place in Tahrir Square, the focal point of the Egyptian revolution. 
With the cabinet offering its resignation a few days prior, transitional military rulers as 
security forces carried out an increasingly lethal crackdown on three days of violent street 
protests, reviving the uncertainty about Egypt’s future that marked the earliest days of the 
Arab uprising. Egypt’s military had been viewed as the linchpin of the political transition 
after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak. The cabinet’s offer to resign, in a bow to 
protestors’ demands, was a blow to the tenuous legitimacy of the ruling military council2.  
B. Political and Economic Context 
Many political analysts have argued that the pre-revolution state of affairs in the 
Arab world, particularly Egypt and Tunisia had created a pressure cooker waiting to 
burst. Although, as James Gelvin argues, there is no inevitability, some of the political 
and economic conditions on the eve of the revolution provide can help provide context to 
                                                 
2 David Kirkpatrick, “Egypt’s Cabinet Offers to Resign as Protests Rage,” New York Times, November 21, 
2011. (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/22/world/middleeast/facing-calls-to-give-up-power-
egypts-military-battles-crowds.html ). 
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the uprisings. The following outlines some of the key characteristics of the Arab world on 
the brink of insurrection. 
A series of reports prepared by the Regional Bureau for Arab States of the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) outlined the political conditions of the region, 
and painted a bleak picture on the eve of the revolution. None of the countries, with the 
exception of Jordan, ranked above the international mean of metrics that measured civil 
rights, political rights and independence of media. Eight of the twenty Arab states 
surveyed ranked above the international means in the quality of public services and the 
bureaucracy and independence of civil service. The report categorized almost all Arab 
states as “black-hole states,” in which the executive branch of the government was so 
powerful that it “converts the surrounding environments into a setting in which nothing 
movies and from which nothing escapes.”3  
In a separate report prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the G-
8 meeting in 2011, it outlined some of the key economic indicators of the Middle East 
and North Africa region. Over the course of the past three decades, the GDP growth in 
the region averaged 3 percent, while the rest of the developing world grew at the rate of 
4.5 percent. It calculated that to absorb the unemployed and new entrants to the job 
market, the annual GDP would have to grow at a rate of 7.5 percent. Further, it 
highlighted that exports had remained flat in recent decades, with the exception of oil and 
gas, and about 60 percent of the region’s exports go to Europe implying limited 
interaction with emerging markets such as China. The number of jobs grew as 2 percent 
                                                 
3 James Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 5 
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annually between 2000 and 2007 and overall unemployment in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria and Tunisia hovered between 10 and 12 percent.4  
                                                 
4 Ibid., 11. 
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II. Literature Review 
A. Economic News and Stock Markets 
There is a substantial body of research devoted to understanding the determinants 
of stock prices, especially in terms of economic news. Most attempts to explain the 
sources of stock volatility have focused on the interplay of the stock market and easily 
observable real and financial variables. Fama et al. (1969) conducted one of the foremost 
studies of testing the speed of adjustment of stock prices to specific kinds of new 
information. By examining the process by which common stock prices adjust to the stock 
split information, they conclude that stock markets are “efficient” in the sense that stock 
markets adjust very rapidly to new information. Moreover, their evidence indicates that 
on average the market’s judgments concerning the information implications of a split are 
fully reflected in the price of a share at least by the end of the split month but most 
probably almost immediately after the announcement date.  
Pearce & Roley (1984) examined the daily responses of stock prices, based on the 
S&P 500, to economic news such as announcements about the money supply, inflation, 
real economic activity, and the discount rate using survey data to identify the unexpected 
component, or the surprise, of the announcements. They use survey data on market 
participants’ expectations of economic announcements in order to construct direct 
measures of the unexpected changes. Although the authors found that new information 
related directly to monetary policy significantly affects stock prices, they found limited 
evidence of impact from inflation surprises and no evidence of an impact from real 
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activity surprise on the announcement days. Furthermore, they found weak evidence of 
stock price responses to surprises beyond the announcement day.  
Chen et al. (1986) found several economic variables to be significant in 
explaining expected stock returns most notably, industrial production, changes in the risk 
premium, twists in the yield curves and somewhat more weakly, measures of 
unanticipated inflation and changes in expected inflation during periods when these 
variables were highly volatile. They concluded that stock returns are exposed to 
systematic economic news, that they are priced in accordance with their exposures, and 
that the news can be measured as innovations in state variables whose identification can 
be accomplished through simple and intuitive financial theory.  
B. Political News and Stock Markets 
It is difficult to study the effects of political disruptions on the market returns 
because of the complexity in controlling for investors’ expectations prior to major events. 
Cutler, Poterba & Summers (1989) analyze the stock market reactions to 
identifiable world news. Their results suggest the difficulty of explaining as much as half 
the variance in aggregate stock prices on the basis of publicly available news bearing on 
fundamental values. They find that while events such as wars, the Presidency, or 
significant changes in financial policies have an effect on moving stock prices, they are 
skeptical of the view that such qualitative news can account for all the variation in return.  
On the other hand, there are several studies that found significant linkages 
between political uncertainty and stock prices. Bittlingmayer (1998) found that politics 
play a significant role in explaining volatility in Germany’s stock market during World 
War I, the 1918 Armstice, and the political turbulence of 1920. His analysis considers key 
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events of post war Weimar Germany, marked by revolution, an unstable republic and 
insurrection among other political agitations. By using a different strategy from his 
predecessors, of examining a dramatic political shift rather than simple news stories, he 
was able to explain a significant amount of variation in returns in post war Germany. He 
concludes that his results offer support for the view that causation runs from political 
uncertainty to stock prices.  
In the context of volatility, Mitchell & Mulherin (1994) find that publicly 
available information, including major news stories, accounts for only a small fraction of 
observed daily volatility in stock markets. Further, Voth (2002) identifies strong evidence 
in favor of a link between share price volatility during the Great Depression and the fear 
about social unrest and the danger of a violent challenge to the economic status quo. By 
explaining between half and two-thirds of the volatility during the Great Depression, he 
provides direct evidence in favor of the Merton/Schwert hypothesis5 by accounting for a 
measure of the risk of revolution, based on the observed correlations between social 
unrest, political violence, and the revolutions that do not occur in his sample period. He 
argues that this “threat variable” is a highly significant predictor of higher stock volatility. 
C. Emerging Markets 
In the context of emerging markets, Kim & Pei (2001) discovered that unexpected 
return jumps in the Hong Kong market index are closely associated with political news, 
and that the impact of this news is asymmetric, with bad news associated with greater 
                                                 
5 Schwert (1989) argues that when all likely explanations for abnormal volatility are insufficient, the most 
likely one is political risk, the nature of which threatens the survival of an entire regime. Merton (1980) 
further argues that relatively small changes in the probability of a momentous shock lead to extreme swings 
in market sentiment. 
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volatility than good news. Further, they find that the largest market movements in Hong 
Kong were often associated with major political news. Hassan et al. (2003) analyze the 
factors that determine the volatility and predictability using a sample of 10 emerging 
markets in the Middle East and Africa region (MEAF). They use quantitative measures of 
political, financial, and economic risk and find that shocks in these ratings shift volatility 
parameters in MEAF emerging markets. Furthermore, their results show that local factors 
represented by these risks have a high power in predicting returns in the MEAF emerging 
markets.  
Amihud & Wuhl (2004) examine the effects of changes in the market’s 
expectations of Saddam Hussein’s fall from power. They find a significant difference in 
the effects of the probability of Saddam’s fall between the war period and the pre-war 
period indicating a change in the interpretation of the news reflected in the Saddam 
contract prices6. However, the weak explanatory power of the news of his fall suggests 
that moves in stock markets reflect something other than fundamental values, as 
suggested by Cutler et al. (1989)7. Amihud & Wuhl also detect a gradual adjustment of 
stock prices to information prior to the war but hypothesize that fads and media attention 
contributed to setting investor expectations about Hussein’s fall during the war itself 
revealing a stronger effect on stock prices, oil prices and exchange rates.  
Jensen & Schmith (2005) perform an event study to examine the stock market 
responses to political events in the context of the 2002 Brazilian presidential election. 
                                                 
6 Amihud & Wulf refer to “Sadddam contracts” as traded contracts that promise a fixed amount of Saddam 
were out of power by the contracts’ expiration dates. They monitor the prices of these contracts as a means 
to control for investors’ expectations. 
7 Cutler et al. (1989) contend that volatility may reflect changes that take place in average assessments of 
given sets of information regarding fundamental values as investors re-examine existing data or present 
new arguments. 
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They use movements in the Brazilian stock market as proxies for future expectations for 
the Brazilian economy and employ a GARCH8 model which allows them to model both 
the conditional mean return and the variance. Their analysis finds no statistically 
significant impact of their political variables on mean return. They contend that while the 
rise of Lula (often regarded as the most popular politician in the history of Brazil) 
increased uncertainty about the country’s economic future, it did not clearly signal a 
decline. More conclusively, they find a positive impact on the volatility of the Brazilian 
stock market and they attribute the increase in uncertainty in financial markets to the 
uncertainty of Lula’s policies and not to the uncertainty of the election itself. Their 
findings suggest that markets did not expect that Lula’s rise would have a clear negative 
impact on firms’ future performance, contrary to the discussions in the popular media. 
As Pagan & Schwert (1990) as well as Jensen & Schmith (2005) have 
demonstrated, conventional ARCH and GARCH models fail to capture the rise in share 
price variability. Schwert (1989) observes that the U.S. and world economies came out of 
the Depression quite well even though at the time, investors could not have had such 
confident expectations. He argues that when all likely explanations are insufficient, the 
most likely one is political risk during the Great Depression, in that the very survival of 
the capitalist system, even in the United States, was seen to be at risk. Merton (1980) also 
points to the relatively small changes in the probability of a momentous shock leading to 
the extreme swings in market sentiment. 
                                                 
8  GARCH refers to the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model. 
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D. Motivation 
My research seeks to study the wealth effects of political events in the context of 
the Arab uprisings, a major contemporary world event with far-reaching economic and 
sociological ramifications. By employing the OLS market model as specified by Brown 
and Warner (1984), it seeks to calculate unexpected  or abnormal stock returns of major 
indices in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Dubai and London 
with respect to the S&P 500, in the context of predefined time windows around major 
events. Specifically, it seeks to examine if key political events characterized by large 
scale protests and overthrow of regimes, can statistically significantly explain 
abnormality in return and by how much. 
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III. Methodology and Empirical Analysis 
A. Dataset 
The dataset for this study is constructed from closing day prices of aggregate 
capitalization weighted equity indices in each of the countries considered namely Egypt, 
Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Dubai, London and New York. The 
countries were selected based on impact of disruptions caused by the uprisings, and partly 
on the availability of data.  Closing day prices for each index were obtained from the 
Bloomberg database. The specifics of each index are provided in Table II with detailed 
descriptions provided in Table A of the Appendix. Daily data is used for this study based 
on the conclusions drawn by Brown & Warner (1984) that the use of daily data is 
straightforward and generally reinforce the robustness of the OLS market model under a 
variety of conditions.  
The event dates for this study mark either a large scale civilian protest, the ouster 
of an incumbent autocrat, or a simultaneous occurrence of both. Such massively 
disruptive events are potentially effective signals to investors about the instability of the 
regime and can give rise to a legitimate uncertainty about the survival of the economic 
and political apparatus. The event windows are defined as 7-day periods, assuming 
efficient markets, with 2 days prior and 4 days after the date of the actual event. This tries 
to take into account investors’ expectations in anticipation of the event as well as the lag 
between the dissemination of news and the occurrence of the event itself as much as 
possible. The specifics of the event windows are provided in Table III. 
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Table V reports missing data points for each of the indices considered. The lack of 
data is attributed to either stock exchange closure over weekends or suspension of trading 
for more than 3 days. Data points over weekends outside event windows were 
extrapolated from the closing price of the previous day. No extrapolation was done for 
more than 3 days of missing data. 
B. Daily Returns 
To examine the wealth effects correlated with political upheavals during the Arab 
revolution, I analyze daily equity returns calculated using closing day index prices. 
Figures 1 is a simple line plot of daily returns over the entire time period of this study i.e. 
between 12/1/2010 and 12/1/2011. The dotted lines mark key events that I study, as 
specified above. It is noteworthy that many significant jumps in returns are seen 
immediately after major events.  
Figure 2 is a simple line plot of cumulative daily returns of the stock indices, with 
dotted lines marking key events. This chart supports the view that large stock movements 
were the result of sudden, specific political developments. Moreover, it shows that overall 
wealth, as characterized by cumulative equity returns was lost over the course of the one 
year that this study takes into consideration. This effect is most significantly 
demonstrated by Egypt and Tunisia, the epicenters of the revolution, with each of them 
experiencing pervasive turmoil and consequently, dramatic changes in regime. 
Tables VI (A) through VI (G) display daily index returns isolated by the event 
windows as defined earlier. The data in each of the tables is visually represented by a 
corresponding simple line plot, with dotted lines marking key events.  
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C. Descriptive Statistics 
Table IV provides summary statistics of daily index returns during the entire time 
period of this study i.e. between 12/1/2010 and 12/1/2011. Figure 3 visually represents 
the corresponding means and standard deviations.  
It is noteworthy that mean returns are mostly negative, signifying a loss of wealth 
during the time period. Although Egypt has the least available data points, it notably 
shows the lowest mean and minimum values indicating the lowest decline in market 
returns during the time period, as compared other nations. This is consistent with the fact 
that it was politically and economically the most affected by the uprisings during the time 
period. Further, Egypt’s high standard deviation in returns suggests a high level of 
volatility during the time period reflecting the pervasive market sentiment of uncertainty.  
D. OLS Market Model Regression Methodology 
This section describes the methodology and regression model employed in my 
analysis. I use the OLS market model as specified by Brown & Warner (1984) to estimate 
daily abnormal returns of each country’s representative index with respect to market 
returns as represented by the S&P 500. Figure 4 specifies the estimation period used to 
estimate regression coefficients and event windows within which abnormal returns are 
calculated. 
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Figure 4. Event study timeline. 
 The interval T0-T1 is the estimation period (-32 to -2 relative to event day 0 
=>30 days) 
 The interval T1-T2 is the event window (-2 to +4 relative to event day 0 => 7 
days) 
 Time 0 is the event date in calendar time 
 The interval T2-T3 is the post-event window 
I estimate abnormal returns using the following equation: 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 −  ?̂? − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡 
Where: 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠/𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡 
𝑅𝑚,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑕𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑆&𝑃 500 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑡 
?̂? =  𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
?̂?𝑖 =  𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑕𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥′𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛  
I regress the daily returns of each of the indices independently on daily market 
returns (represented by the S&P 500) to estimate intercept and slope coefficients ?̂? and ?̂?𝑖 
within the 30-day estimation periods as specified. I then plug those coefficients into the 
OLS market model equation to obtain abnormal returns of each of the indices within the 
specific event windows as shown in Tables VII (A) through VII (G). 
T0 = -32 T1= -2 0 T2 = +4 T3 
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To test for statistical significance, I estimated the standard deviation of the 
residuals from the estimation period and the cumulative abnormal returns for each event 
window. I then calculated the t-value for N indices and T days using the following 
formula. 
 
Where:  
ARn,t = the abnormal return for country n on day t of the event window 
σAR(n) = the estimated standard deviation of abnormal returns (estimated as the standard 
deviation of residuals from the estimation period). 
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IV. Results 
 As observed by many scholars of existing literature, it is difficult to distinguish 
the part of the political news that is unanticipated. As stated by Fama et al. (1969), 
according to the efficient market hypothesis, security prices should only respond to the 
unexpected part of any announcement i.e. that part which is truly news, since the 
expected part of the announcement should already be embedded in stock prices. It is also 
difficult to rule out the overlapping effects of the events given their close proximity in 
occurrence. The event windows are defined to be as exclusive as possible with the aim of 
minimizing contamination in results. Contamination may also occur due to the effects of 
the simultaneous occurrence of other world events, which are difficult to control for. 
In addition, there is potential for a lag between the occurrence of an event and 
investors’ obtaining information about it, based on which they make decisions. This could 
be as a result of the deterioration of communication infrastructure as well as censorship 
from the respective governments that faced the threat of being overthrown. A lag could 
also be as a result of periods of uncertainty immediately following dramatic events 
characteristic of the uprisings, when risk-averse investors are quickly cashing out 
whereas more diversified investors remain bullish. Furthermore, the effects of most of the 
events I study are most likely to spill over into large global indices in an interconnected 
financial system. This potentially creates a bias in my measurement of abnormal returns 
relative to a market index like the S&P 500. 
 Tables VII (A) through VII (G) show daily abnormal index returns calculated with 
respect to market return (S&P 500) using the OLS market model for specified 7- day 
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event windows. Figures 6(a) through 6(g) visually represent the same. The dates of the 
actual events are in bold and weekends are marked in italics. The following is an analysis 
of key results with respect to of the event windows. T-statistics for each of the event 
windows are provided in Table B of the Appendix. 
  On December 17th, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, a vegetable vendor in a small 
town in Tunisia, sparked the beginning of the Arab uprisings through an act of self-
immolation. Abnormal index returns for the corresponding event window reflect some of 
the initial wealth effects as shown by Table VII (A) with a visual representation in Figure 
6(a). While Tunisia does not show any statistically significant declines, London shows 
negative abnormal returns of about 0.85 percent on the day of the event, significant at the 
5 percent level. 
On January 14th, 2011, President Ben Ali of Tunisia flees the country after many 
weeks of trying to mollify the raging crowds. Abnormal returns for the corresponding 
event are provided in Table VII (B) with a visual representation in Figure 6(b). Arguably 
in anticipation of his departure, the Tunisian stock market demonstrates dramatic negative 
abnormal returns of 2.6 percent two days prior and 2.5 percent one day prior to the event, 
both at a 1 percent level of statistical significance. Lebanon shows negative returns of a 
similar magnitude with a drop of about 3 percent two days prior and about 0.5 percent on 
the day prior to the event, also significant at the 1 percent level. 
On February 9th, 2011, President Hosni Mubarak, the long incumbent dictator of 
Egypt announces his resignation. Abnormal returns for the corresponding event are 
provided in Table VII (C) with a visual representation in Figure 6(c). While the Egyptian 
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stock market remain closed for trading, Tunisia shows negative abnormal returns of about 
2 percent at the 5 percent level on the day of the event and Jordan shows negative returns 
of about 0.75 percent on the day prior, at the 5 percent level. London shows negative 
returns of about 0.2 percent, albeit only at the 10 percent level. 
On February 25th, 2011, the Prime Minister of Tunisia, Mohammed Ghannouchi 
also announces his resignation and large scale protests erupt in the capital city of Tunis. 
Abnormal returns for the corresponding event are provided in Table VII (D) with a visual 
representation of the same in Figure 6(d). The Tunisian stock index shows negative 
returns of about 3 percent two days prior to the event, significant at the 5 percent level, 
following which the Tunisian stock exchange suspends trading for the remainder of 
February and half way through March.  
A few days later, on March 3rd, 2011, the Prime Minister of Egypt, Ahmed Shafiq 
steps down from office. Given the close proximity of Tunisian Prime Minister 
Ghannouchi’s resignation with that of Egyptian Prime Minister Shafiq, there is most 
likely an overlap which makes it difficult to isolate effects. Abnormal returns for the 
corresponding event are provided in Table VII (E) with a visual representation in Figure 
6(e). Taking into consideration the overlapping effect, Saudi Arabia partly reflects the 
sentiment of investors, with negative returns of 6.5 percent two days prior and 3.5 percent 
decline the day before the event, statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Bahrain 
also exhibits negative returns of about 2 percent, at the 1 percent level while Dubai shows 
negative returns of 1.5 percent, significant at the 10 percent level. Both the Egyptian and 
Tunisian stock exchanges remain closed for the duration of the last two event window. 
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On October 20, 2011,  Col. Gadhafi of Libya is captured and killed in his 
hometown but surprisingly, none of the countries I consider reveal any statistically 
significant abnormal returns, as demonstrated by Table VII (F) and visually represented 
by Figure 6(f).  
One month later, on November 21, 2011, Egypt takes the center stage of the 
uprisings once again with thousands of protestors occupying Tahrir Square in Cairo. 
Abnormal returns for this event are provided Table VII (G) and visually represented in 
Figure 6(g). The Egyptian stock market reacts dramatically with negative abnormal 
returns of about 5 percent, statistically significant at the 1 percent level, on the day of the 
event. No other countries show any statistically significant returns within this event 
window. 
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V. Conclusion 
 Using stock returns from major indices in Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain and London, I find that, over the December 1, 2010 to December 1, 2011 
period of the Arab uprisings, stock markets show negative abnormal returns oftentimes 
highly statistically significant relative to the S&P 500. My findings are consistent with 
the conclusion drawn by Bittlingmayer (1998) in that there are significant linkages 
between some of the dramatic political disruptions of the Arab uprisings and stock returns 
in the region.  
 While acknowledging the many possibilities of bias, one of the most notable 
events of my study is the ouster of Tunisian President Ben Ali with negative cumulative 
abnormal returns of 5 percent in Tunisia and 3.5 percent in Lebanon in the two days prior 
to the event. The subsequent ouster of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak demonstrated 
statistically significant negative abnormal returns in Tunisia of about 2 percent on the day 
of the event. It is particularly difficult to isolate the effects of the resignations of Tunisian 
Prime Minister Ghannouchi and Egyptian Prime Minister Shafiq given their close 
proximity of occurrences, but Saudi Arabia showed highly statistically significant 
negative abnormal returns cumulated to about 10 percent in the two days prior to the 
event. The large scale occupation of Tahrir Square on November 19th is associated with a 
statistically significant negative abnormal return of 4.7 percent in Egypt on the day of the 
event. Surprisingly, my study finds no statistically significant returns associated with the 
capture and assassination of Libyan dictator, Col. Gadhafi. Finally, it is noteworthy that 
the stock exchanges of Egypt and Tunisia suspended trading during most of the months of 
February and March 2011, at the height of their political and economic instability. 
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 While my research examines one dimension of the wealth implications of the 
uprisings, there are many other opportunities for further research on this topic. Other 
dependent variables such as oil price or insurance industry price indices can be used to 
calculate abnormal returns and examine wealth effects manifested in other markets. 
Further, the event study methodology could be extended to draw conclusions about stock 
volatility. Schwert (1989) shows that stock volatility increases for brief periods during 
and immediately after financial crises or bank panics, but there are no long-term effects 
on volatility, which he characterizes as the “volatility problem”. The events of the Arab 
uprisings can be effectively used to perform an explicit test of the Merton/Schwert 
hypothesis that dramatic changes in regime add to the fundamental uncertainty reflected 
in past and future volatility.  
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Table III 
Event Windows 
This table defines the 7-day event periods with respect to the date of the actual event between 
12/1/2010 and 12/1/2011. The event dates for this study mark either a large scale civilian protest, 
the ouster of an incumbent autocrat, or a simultaneous occurrence of both. Dates of the actual 
event are obtained from NPR’s timeline of major events cited in the references section. 
Event Date Event Window Event 
12/17/2010 12/15/2010 - 12/22/2010 Bouazizi (vegetable vendor) sets himself on fire. 
1/14/2011 1/12/2011 - 1/18/2011 
Ben Ali (President of Tunisia) flees; Mass 
protests in Jordan. 
2/11/2011 2/9/2011 - 2/15/2011 
Mubarak (President of Egypt) announces 
resignation. 
2/27/2011 2/25/2011 - 3/3/2011 
Ghannouchi (PM of Tunisia) announces 
resignation. 
 
3/3/2011 3/1/2011 - 3/7/2011 Shafiq (PM of Egypt) steps down. 
10/20/2011 10/18/2011 - 10/24/2011 Gaddafi (Ruler of Libya) is captured and killed. 
11/21/2011 11/19/2011 - 11/25/2011 
Mass demonstrations at Tahrir Square in Cairo, 
Egypt. 
  
Table II 
Stock Indices 
This table provides a list of stock indices employed in calculating returns. Closing day prices for 
each of the indices was obtained from the Bloomberg database for the 12/1/2010 - 12/1/2011 
period. Each index is capitalization weighted and best represents aggregate equity returns for its 
respective country. A detailed description of each index is provided in the Appendix. 
Country Name Date of Origination 
Egypt EGX 30 Index 2003 
Tunisia Tunisia Stock Exchange TUNINDEX 1997 
Jordan Amman Stock Exchange General Index 1993 
Lebanon BLOM Stock Index 1996 
Saudi Arabia Tawadul All Share TASI Index 2008* 
Bahrain Bahrain Bourse All Share Index 2004 
Dubai Dubai Financial Market General Index 2004 
London FTSE All-Share Index 1962 
New York S&P 500 Index 1957 
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Table IV 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides summary statistics of daily index returns between 12/1/2010 and 12/1/2011. 
Descriptions of indices are provided in the Appendix. 
Country N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Egypt 294 -0.14 0.09 -10.89 5.22 
Tunisia 323 -0.03 0.05 -3.51 5.85 
Jordan 328 -0.04 0.02 -1.80 1.29 
Lebanon 331 -0.05 0.03 -3.22 2.85 
Saudi Arabia 321 -0.01 0.05 -6.78 4.52 
Bahrain 333 -0.07 0.02 -2.71 1.52 
Dubai 339 -0.04 0.05 -3.83 4.32 
London 341 0.00 0.07 -6.05 4.71 
New York 338 0.02 0.07 -6.66 4.74 
 
 
Figure 3. Descriptive Statistics: daily index returns between 12/1/2010 and 12/1/2011. Data is 
from Bloomberg.  
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Table V 
Missing Data Points 
This table provides a list of all the missing stock return data points within the period 12/1/2010 and 
12/1/2011 (366 days). Closing day price data was obtained from Bloomberg. All the missing data 
points are attributed to either stock exchange closure over weekends or suspension of trading for 
more than 3 days, as reported by prominent sources such as BBC news. 
Country # of missing data points 
Egypt 71 
Tunisia 42 
Jordan 37 
Lebanon 34 
Saudi Arabia 44 
Bahrain 32 
Dubai 26 
London 24 
New York 27 
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Table VI (A) 
Daily Returns: 12/15/2010 - 12/21/2010 
This table provides daily returns of stock indices during the event period as specified above. Date(s) 
of actual events are marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. “-” refers to the unavailability 
of a data point. Description of indices is given in the Appendix.  
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
New 
York 
12/15/2010 -0.78 -0.29 0.04 0.33 -0.37 - -0.84 -1.68 -0.51 
12/16/2010 -0.58 -0.04 -0.48 - - - 0.56 0.28 0.62 
12/17/2010 - - - - - - - -0.89 0.08 
12/18/2010 - - - - - - - - - 
12/19/2010 - - - - 0.20 - - - - 
12/20/2010 0.24 - -0.22 - 0.28 - -0.53 - - 
12/21/2010 0.45 0.09 0.23 0.12 0.15 -0.24 -0.39 0.70 0.60 
 
 Figure 5(a). Daily Returns: 12/15/2010 – 12/21/2010. Dotted lines signify key events. Points at 
0 signify unavailable data point. Data is from Bloomberg.  
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Table VI (B) 
Daily Returns: 1/12/2011 - 1/18/2011 
This table provides daily returns of stock indices during the event period as specified above. Date(s) of 
actual events are marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. “-” refers to the unavailability of 
a data point. Description of indices is given in the Appendix.  
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
New 
York 
1/12/2011 -0.30 -2.83 -0.06 -3.22 0.24 0.13 -0.35 1.36 0.90 
1/13/2011 0.39 -2.68 -0.24 -0.25 - 0.34 -0.18 0.39 -0.17 
1/14/2011 - 0.20 - 0.63 - - - -0.22 0.74 
1/15/2011 - - - - - - - - - 
1/16/2011 - - - - 0.14 - - - - 
1/17/2011 -2.82 - -0.04 - -0.30 -0.31 0.53 - - 
1/18/2011 -3.11 - -0.11 -0.58 -0.78 -0.41 0.83 1.56 - 
 
 
Figure 5(b). Daily Returns: 1/12/2011 – 1/18/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. Points at 0 
signify unavailable data point. Data is from Bloomberg. 
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Table VI (C) 
Daily Returns: 2/9/2011 - 2/15/2011 
This table provides daily returns of stock indices during the event period as specified above. Date(s) of 
actual events are marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. “-” refers to the unavailability of 
a data point. Description of indices is given in the Appendix.  
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
New 
York 
2/9/2011 - 1.12 -0.81 - 0.15 -0.02 -0.22 -0.60 -0.28 
2/10/2011 - -1.26 -0.63 - - 0.03 -0.27 -0.42 0.07 
2/11/2011 - -2.12 - 0.07 - - - -0.01 0.55 
2/12/2011 - - - - - - - - - 
2/13/2011 - - - - -0.14 - - - - 
2/14/2011 - - -1.51 - -0.05 0.12 0.21 - - 
2/15/2011 - - - - -0.27 - 0.51 0.28 -0.32 
 
 
Figure 5(c). Daily Returns: 2/9/2011 – 2/15/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. Points at 0 
signify unavailable data point. Data is from Bloomberg. 
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Table VI (D) 
Daily Returns: 2/25/2011 - 3/3/2011 
This table provides daily returns of stock indices during the event period as specified above. Date(s) 
of actual events are marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. “-” refers to the unavailability 
of a data point. Description of indices is given in the Appendix.  
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
New 
York 
2/25/2011 - -2.76 - -0.19 - - - 1.22 1.06 
2/26/2011 - - - - - - - - - 
2/27/2011 - - - - - - - - - 
2/28/2011 - - -1.03 
 
-0.16 -0.40 -3.83 - - 
3/1/2011 - - 0.56 0.17 -6.78 -0.45 1.00 -0.71 -1.57 
3/2/2011 - - -1.34 -0.56 -3.89 -1.02 -3.53 -0.04 0.16 
3/3/2011 - - -0.87 0.31 - -2.30 -1.61 1.02 1.72 
 
 
Figure 5(d). Daily Returns: 2/25/2011 – 3/3/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. Points at 0 
signify unavailable data point. Data is from Bloomberg.  
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Table VI (E) 
Daily Returns: 3/1/2011 - 3/7/2011 
This table provides daily returns of stock indices during the event period as specified above. Date(s) of 
actual events are marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. “-” refers to the unavailability of 
a data point. Description of indices is given in the Appendix.  
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
New 
York 
3/1/2011 - - 0.56 0.17 -6.78 -0.45 1.00 -0.71 -1.57 
3/2/2011 - - -1.34 -0.56 -3.89 -1.02 -3.53 -0.04 0.16 
3/3/2011 - - -0.87 0.31 - -2.30 -1.61 1.02 1.72 
3/4/2011 - - - - - - - -0.20 -0.74 
3/5/2011 - - - - - - - - - 
3/6/2011 - - - - 0.93 - - - - 
3/7/2011 - - -0.50 - 3.26 0.10 -1.00 - - 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5(e). Daily Returns: 3/1/2011 – 3/7/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. Points at 0 
signify unavailable data point. Data is from Bloomberg.  
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Table VI (F) 
Daily Returns: 10/18/2011 - 10/25/2011 
This table provides daily returns of stock indices during the event period as specified above. Date(s) of 
actual events are marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. “-” refers to the unavailability of a 
data point. Description of indices is given in the Appendix.  
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
New 
York 
10/18/2011 -0.78 -0.11 0.34 0.12 0.31 -0.04 -0.62 -1.00 2.04 
10/19/2011 1.05 0.44 0.53 0.00 -0.71 -0.06 0.41 1.32 -1.26 
10/20/2011 0.01 -0.20 0.42 -0.26 - -0.25 0.22 -1.55 0.46 
10/21/2011 - 0.81 
 
-0.06 - - - 3.05 1.88 
10/22/2011 - - - - - - - - - 
10/23/2011 - - - - 0.45 - - - - 
10/24/2011 0.36 - -0.10 - -0.07 -0.03 -0.32 - - 
 
 
Figure 5(f). Daily Returns: 10/18/2011 – 10/25/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. Points at 
0 signify unavailable data point. Data is from Bloomberg.  
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Table VI (G) 
Daily Returns: 11/19/2011 - 11/26/2011 
This table provides daily returns of stock indices during the event period as specified above. Date(s) of 
actual events are marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. “-” refers to the unavailability of a 
data point. Description of indices is given in the Appendix.  
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
New 
York 
11/19/2011 - - - - -0.34 - - - - 
11/20/2011 - - - - 0.13 - - - - 
11/21/2011 -4.12 - -1.24 - -0.86 -1.26 -0.85 - - 
11/22/2011 -4.87 0.01 -0.85 - -0.82 - -0.30 -0.33 -0.41 
11/23/2011 1.06 -1.04 1.11 - -0.28 -0.56 -0.30 -2.11 -2.21 
11/24/2011 1.63 -0.20 0.27 0.08 - - 0.11 -0.37 - 
11/25/2011 - -0.33 - 0.01 - - - 0.30 - 
 
 
Figure 5(g). Daily Returns: 11/19/2011 – 11/26/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. Points at 
0 signify unavailable data point. Data is from Bloomberg. 
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Table VII (A) 
Abnormal Returns: 12/15/2010 - 12/21/2010 
This table presents the abnormal returns of each of the indices considered within the 7-day event period 
specified above. Descriptions of indices are provided in the Appendix. The date(s) of the actual events 
are in marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. Abnormal returns are calculated using the 
OLS market model where regression coefficients are estimated from a 30-day estimation period prior to 
the event period. *, **, *** measure 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance respectively. T-
statistics are provided in the Appendix. “-” refers to an unavailable data point. 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
12/15/2010 -0.74 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.08 
 
0.189 
 
-0.34 
 
- 
 
-0.55 
 
-0.84 
 
12/16/2010 -0.77 
 
0.044 
 
-0.46 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.618 
 
-0.41 
 
12/17/2010 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.85 ** 
12/18/2010 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
12/19/2010 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
12/20/2010 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
12/21/2010 0.26   0.18   0.245   0.097   -0.02   -0.03   -0.33   0.029   
 
 
Figure 6(a). Abnormal returns: 12/15/2010 – 12/21/2010. Dotted lines signify key events. 
Points at 0 signify unavailable data points. Data is from Bloomberg. 
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Table VII (B) 
Abnormal Returns: 1/12/2011 - 1/18/2011 
This table presents the abnormal returns of each of the indices considered within the 7-day event period 
specified above. Descriptions of indices are provided in the Appendix. The date(s) of the actual events are 
in marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. Abnormal returns are calculated using the OLS 
market model where regression coefficients are estimated from a 30-day estimation period prior to the 
event period. *, **, *** measure 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance respectively. T-
statistics are provided in the Appendix. “-” refers to an unavailable data point. 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
1/12/2011 -0.23 
 
-2.55 *** -0.01 
 
-2.97 *** -0.07 
 
0.444 
 
0.023 
 
0.779 
 1/13/2011 0.212 
 
-2.47 *** -0.45 
 
-0.54 *** - 
 
0.24 
 
-0.15 
 
0.476 ** 
1/14/2011 - 
 
0.472 *** - 
 
0.797 *** - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.7 
 1/15/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 1/16/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 1/17/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 1/18/2011 -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   
 
 
 
Figure 6(b). Abnormal returns: 1/12/2011 – 1/18/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. Points 
at 0 signify unavailable data points. Data is from Bloomberg.  
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Table VII (C) 
Abnormal Returns: 2/9/2011 - 2/15/2011 
This table presents the abnormal returns of each of the indices considered within the 7-day event period 
specified above. Descriptions of indices are provided in the Appendix. The date(s) of the actual events are 
in marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. Abnormal returns are calculated using the OLS 
market model where regression coefficients are estimated from a 30-day estimation period prior to the 
event period. *, **, *** measure 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance respectively. T-
statistics are provided in the Appendix. “-” refers to an unavailable data point. 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
2/9/2011 - 
 
1.178 
 
-1.02 * -  
0.044 
 
-0.17 
 
-0.25 
 
-0.47 
 2/10/2011 - 
 
-1.18 
 
-0.75 ** - 
 
- 
 
0.017 
 
-0.2 
 
-0.45 
 
2/11/2011 - 
 
-2.01 ** - 
 
0.036 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.26 * 
2/12/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2/13/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2/14/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2/15/2011 -   -   -   -   -0.37   n/d   0.47   0.426   
 
 
Figure 6(c). Abnormal returns: 2/9/2011 – 2/15/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. Points at 
0 signify unavailable data points. Data is from Bloomberg.  
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Table VII (D) 
Abnormal Returns: 2/25/2011 - 3/3/2011 
This table presents the abnormal returns of each of the indices considered within the 7-day event period 
specified above. Descriptions of indices are provided in the Appendix. The date(s) of the actual events are in 
marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. Abnormal returns are calculated using the OLS market 
model where regression coefficients are estimated from a 30-day estimation period prior to the event period. 
*, **, *** measure 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance respectively. T-statistics are provided 
in the Appendix. “-” refers to an unavailable data point. 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
2/25/2011 - 
 
-3.02 ** - 
 
0.137 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.327 
 2/26/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 2/27/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 2/28/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
3/1/2011 - 
 
- 
 
0.71 
 
-0.16 
 
-6.65 *** -0.19 
 
1.751 
 
0.661 
 
3/2/2011 - 
 
- 
 
-1.09 
 
-0.46 
 
-3.69 *** -1.04 
 
-3.32 
 
-0.16 
 
3/3/2011 -   -   -0.53   0.804   -   -2.56 *** -1.89 *** -0.45 ** 
 
 Figure 6(d). Abnormal returns: 2/25/2011 – 3/3/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. Points 
at 0 signify unavailable data points. Data is from Bloomberg.  
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Table VII (E) 
Abnormal Returns: 3/1/2011 - 3/7/2011 
This table presents the abnormal returns of each of the indices considered within the 7-day event 
period specified above. Descriptions of indices are provided in the Appendix. The date(s) of the actual 
events are in marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. Abnormal returns are calculated 
using the OLS market model where regression coefficients are estimated from a 30-day estimation 
period prior to the event period. *, **, *** measure 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance 
respectively. T-statistics are provided in the Appendix. “-” refers to an unavailable data point. 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
3/1/2011 - 
 
- 
 
0.712 
 
-0.25 
 
-6.45 *** -0.18 
 
1.597 
 
0.62 
 3/2/2011 - 
 
- 
 
-1.1 
 
-0.37 
 
-3.53 *** -0.94 
 
-3.14 
 
-0.2 
 3/3/2011 - 
 
- 
 
-0.55 
 
1.04 
 
- 
 
-2.4 *** -1.4 * -0.49 
 3/4/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.42 
 3/5/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.02 
 3/6/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-0.02 
 3/7/2011 -   -   -   -   -   -   -   0.17   
 
 
Figure 6(e). Abnormal returns: 3/1/2011 – 3/7/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. Points at 
0 signify unavailable data points. Data is from Bloomberg. 
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Table VII (F) 
Abnormal Returns: 10/18/2011 - 10/24/2011 
This table presents the abnormal returns of each of the indices considered within the 7-day event period 
specified above. Descriptions of indices are provided in the Appendix. The date(s) of the actual events 
are in marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. Abnormal returns are calculated using the 
OLS market model where regression coefficients are estimated from a 30-day estimation period prior to 
the event period. *, **, *** measure 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance respectively. T-
statistics are provided in the Appendix. “-” refers to an unavailable data point. 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
10/18/2011 -0.62 
 
-0.17 
 
0.698 
 
0.259 
 
0.234 
 
0.596 
 
-0.16 
 
-1.14 
 10/19/2011 0.952 
 
0.469 
 
0.307 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.66 
 
-0.45 
 
0.126 
 
1.404 
 10/20/2011 0.049 
 
-0.22 
 
0.499 
 
-0.23 
 
- 
 
-0.11 
 
0.322 
 
-1.58 
 10/21/2011 - 
 
0.756 
 
0.328 
 
0.076 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
2.922 
 10/22/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 10/23/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 10/24/2011 -  -  -   -  -  -  -   -  
 
 
Figure 6(f). Abnormal returns: 10/18/2011 – 10/24/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. 
Points at 0 signify unavailable data points. Data is from Bloomberg. 
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Table VII (G) 
Abnormal Returns: 11/19/2011 - 11/25/2011 
This table presents the abnormal returns of each of the indices considered within the 7-day event period 
specified above. Descriptions of indices are provided in the Appendix. The date(s) of the actual events 
are in marked in bold and weekends are marked in italics. Abnormal returns are calculated using the 
OLS market model where regression coefficients are estimated from a 30-day estimation period prior to 
the event period. *, **, *** measure 10%, 5%, and 1% levels of statistical significance respectively. T-
statistics are provided in the Appendix. “-” refers to an unavailable data point. 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Bahrain Dubai London 
11/19/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
11/20/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
11/21/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
11/22/2011 -4.68 *** 0.081 
 
-1.08 
 
- 
 
-0.82 
 
- 
 
-0.26 
 
0.065 
 
11/23/2011 1.431 ** -0.64 
 
0.778 
 
- 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.66 
 
0.021 
 
-0.33 
 
11/24/2011 - 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
11/25/2011 -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   
 
 
Figure 6(g). Abnormal returns: 11/19/2011 – 11/25/2011. Dotted lines signify key events. 
Points at 0 signify unavailable data points. Data is from Bloomberg. 
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Appendix 
Table A 
Description of Stock Indices 
This table provides a description of all stock indices used in this study. Closing day prices were 
obtained from the Bloomberg database for the period 12/1/2010 - 12/1/2011. 
Country Symbol Name Profile 
Egypt CASE:IND EGX 30 Index 
The EGX 30 Index is a free-float capitalization 
weighted index of the 30 most highly capitalized 
and liquid stocks traded on the Egyptian Exchange. 
EGX 30 constituents are reviewed and changed 
twice a year (February and August). The index was 
developed with a base level of 1000 as of January 
1st 1998 and previously named CASE 30 Index. 
Tunisia TUSISE:IND 
Tunisia Stock 
Exchange 
TUNINDEX 
The Tunis Stock Exchange TUNINDEX is a 
capitalization weighted index containing equities 
from the TSE. This index is open to listed 
companies admitted in the capital market with 
minimum period of quotation of one month. The 
index was launched on December 31, 1997 with an 
initial base level of 1000. As of January 2, 2009 
the index has become a free float weighted index. 
Jordan JOSMGNFF:IND 
Amman Stock 
Exchange 
General Index 
The ASE General Index is a free float market cap 
weighted index of the most highly liquid and 
capitalized companies traded on the First and 
Second markets of the Amman Stock Exchange. 
The base value is set to 1000 as end of year 1999. 
The index is maintained, calculated and 
disseminated by the Amman Stock Exchange. 
Lebanon BLOM:IND 
BLOM Stock 
Exchange 
The BLOM Stock Index (BSI) is the first and 
leading index for the stock market in Lebanon. It 
was established on the same day the Beirut Stock 
Exchange Reopened (January 22, 1996) 
Saudi 
Arabia 
SASAEIDX:IND 
Tawadul All 
Share TASI 
Index 
The Tadawul All Share Index (TASI) is 
disseminated by the Saudi Stock Market. The 
index was developed with a base value of 1000 in 
1985 and it was restructured on 06/30/08. Volume 
in the index excludes 'small trades'. (Trades with 
value less than SAR 15000). Volume including the 
'small trades' can be found in VOLTADA Index. 
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Table A – contd. 
Description of Stock Indices 
Country Symbol Name Profile 
Bahrain BHSEASI:IND 
Bahrain Bourse 
All Share Index 
Bahrain Bourse All Share Index is a capitalization-
weighted index of all Bahraini public share-
holding companies listed on the Bahrain Stock 
Exchange. It was launched in 2004. It is a 
benchmark index consisting of all the local 
publicly listed companies on the BSE. 
Dubai DFMGI:IND 
Dubai 
Financial 
Market General 
Index 
Dubai Financial Market General Index is a 
capitalization weighted price index comprising 
stocks of listed companies. The base value of the 
index is 1000 as at January 1st 2004. 
London ASX:IND 
FTSE All-
Share Index 
The FTSE All-Share Index is a capitalization-
weighted index comprising of the FTSE 350 and 
the FTSE Small Cap Indices. The index was 
developed with a base value of 100.00 as of April 
10, 1962. 
New 
York 
SPX:IND S&P 500 Index 
Standard and Poor's 500 Index is a capitalization-
weighted index of 500 stocks. The index is 
designed to measure performance of the broad 
domestic economy through changes in the 
aggregate market value of 500 stocks representing 
all major industries. The index was developed with 
a base level of 10 for the 1941- 43 base periods. 
See SPY US Equity for the tradable equivalent. 
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Table B 
t-values: 12/15/2010 - 12/21/2010 
This table provides t-statistics of abnormal returns relative to market (S&P 500) returns. Standard 
deviation of the residuals is calculated for the 30- day estimation period. Abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for 7-day event windows. Critical values for a two-
tailed test are 1.697 at the 10% level, 2.042 at the 5% level and 2.75 at the 1% level. 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia Bahrain Dubai London 
12/15/2010 -0.855 -0.023 -0.105 0.237 -0.491 - -0.646 -1.174 
12/16/2010 -1.746 0.042 -0.670 - - - 0.081 -1.753 
12/17/2010 - - - - - - - -2.952 
12/18/2010 - - - - - - - - 
12/19/2010 - - - - - - - - 
12/20/2010 - - - - - - - - 
12/21/2010 -1.395 0.437 -0.469 0.085 -0.457 -0.062 -0.177 -2.096 
1/12/2011 - 1/18/2011 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia Bahrain Dubai London 
1/12/2011 -0.366 -2.925 -0.017 -4.271 -0.196 0.911 0.029 1.317 
1/13/2011 -0.034 -5.754 -0.905 -5.042 - 1.403 -0.163 2.122 
1/14/2011 - -5.213 - -3.895 - - - 0.934 
1/15/2011 - - - - - - - - 
1/16/2011 - - - - - - - - 
1/17/2011 - - - - - - - - 
1/18/2011 - - - - - - - - 
2/9/2011 - 2/15/2011 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia Bahrain Dubai London 
2/9/2011 - 2.161 -1.991 - 0.117 -0.331 -0.328 -0.821 
2/10/2011 - -0.001 -3.460 - - -0.297 -0.589 -1.597 
2/11/2011 - -3.689 - 0.071 - - - -2.046 
2/12/2011 - - - - - - - - 
2/13/2011 - - - - - - - - 
2/14/2011 - - - - - - - - 
2/15/2011 - - - - -0.859 n/d 0.281 -1.309 
2/25/2011 - 3/3/2011 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia Bahrain Dubai London 
2/25/2011 - -2.162 - 0.124 - - - 0.627 
2/26/2011 - - - - - - - - 
2/27/2011 - - - - - - - - 
2/28/2011 - - - - - - - - 
3/1/2011 - - 0.772 -0.019 -4.562 -0.225 1.271 1.894 
3/2/2011 - - -0.411 -0.430 -7.094 -1.436 -1.142 1.580 
3/3/2011 - - -0.987 0.294 - -4.431 -2.516 0.708 
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Table B – contd. 
3/1/2011 - 3/7/2011 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia Bahrain Dubai London 
3/1/2011 - - 0.760 -0.246 -3.895 -0.209 1.054 1.443 
3/2/2011 - - -0.411 -0.623 -6.025 -1.327 -1.017 0.978 
3/3/2011 - - -0.997 0.422 - -4.170 -1.942 -0.163 
3/4/2011 - - - - - - - 0.815 
3/5/2011 - - - - - - - - 
3/6/2011 - - - - - - - - 
3/7/2011 - - - - - - - - 
10/18/2011 - 10/24/2011 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia Bahrain Dubai London 
10/18/2011 -0.318 -0.116 0.400 0.176 0.158 0.372 -0.103 -0.741 
10/19/2011 0.172 0.208 0.576 0.117 -0.291 0.089 -0.020 0.175 
10/20/2011 0.197 0.058 0.862 -0.036 - 0.022 0.194 -0.855 
10/21/2011 - 0.581 1.050 0.015 - - - 1.052 
10/22/2011 - - - - - - - - 
10/23/2011 - - - - - - - - 
10/24/2011 - - - - - - - - 
11/19/2011 - 11/25/2011 
Date Egypt Tunisia Jordan Lebanon Saudi Arabia Bahrain Dubai London 
11/19/2011 - - - - - - - - 
11/20/2011 - - - - - - - - 
11/21/2011 - - - - - - - - 
11/22/2011 -3.009 0.062 -0.696 - -0.586 - -0.189 0.065 
11/23/2011 -2.090 -0.427 -0.196 - -0.633 -0.440 -0.175 -0.269 
11/24/2011 - - - - - - - - 
11/25/2011 - - - - - - - - 
 
